Abstract: In this paper, the Kyle model of insider trading is extended by characterizing the trading volume with long memory and allowing the noise trading volatility to follow a general stochastic process. Under this newly revised model, the equilibrium conditions are determined, with which the optimal insider trading strategy, price impact and price volatility are obtained explicitly. The volatility of the price volatility appears excessive, which is a result of the fact that a more aggressive trading strategy is chosen by the insider when uninformed volume is higher. The optimal trading strategy turns out to possess the property of long memory, and the price impact is also affected by the fractional noise.
Introduction
Equilibrium asset pricing is always an important and ongoing topic for any financial market, and it has been extensively studied by a number of authors [9, 11, 18, 28, 31] . It also can be used to deal with insider trading problem and the history can be dated back to 1985, when Kyle [22] developed a model, in which a large trader is assumed to possess long-lived private information about the value of a stock that will be revealed at some known date and optimally trades continuously into the stock to maximize his/her expected profits, while risk-neutral market makers try to infer the information possessed by the insider from the aggregate order flow. The resulted equilibrium price dynamic actually responds linearly to the order flow instead of being fully revealed, since the order flow is also driven by uninformed noise traders aiming solely at liquidity purposes. Albeit appealing, the Kyle model also suffers from two major drawbacks; Kyle's lambda, which is a measurement of the equilibrium price impact of the order flow is constant, and the price volatility turns out to be constant and independent of the noise trading volatility.
To further investigate the impact of asymmetric information on asset prices, volatility, volume, and market liquidity, Admati and Pfleiderer [1] , Foster and Viswanathan [13, 14] were the first to modify the Kyle model, extending it to dynamic economies with myopic agents so that the price volatility is no longer the price impact is taken into consideration.
The rest of this paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 presents some necessary preliminaries.
In Section 3, we introduce the general model and the details on achieving an equilibrium are illustrated.
In Section 4, two specific cases are considered to emphasize key features of the equilibrium and possible extensions are discussed followed by some concluding remarks are given in the last section.
Preliminaries
In this section, some useful concepts and results are presented. We assume that (Ω, F T , P ) is a probability space, with F t σ(X s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t) being the smallest σ-filed with respect to which the random variable X s is measurable for all s ∈ [0, t]. Let L ∞ (Ω, F T , P ) represent the space of all bounded and F -measurable random variables and M c,loc denote the space of all continuous local martingales. Assume that X t is defined as the quadratic variation process of X t and C 1 stands for the space of the continuous functions x = (x t ; 0 ≤ t ≤ 1) on [0, 1]. We also let P and P B(R d+1 ) be the predictable σ-field and the product σ-filed formed from the σ-fields P and B(R d+1 ), respectively. 
where L 1 and L 2 are constants, K(s) is a non-decreasing right continuous function with 0 < K(s) < 1, and
x, y ∈ C 1 . Let η = η(ω) be an F 0 -measurable random variable with P (|η(ω) < ∞|) = 1. Then the equation
has a unique strong solution ξ = (ξ t , F t ).
Let ℓ : R → R + be a strictly positive and continuous function. We say that ℓ belongs to the class L if it satisfies: for all −∞ < a ≤ 0 ≤ b < +∞, the following ODEs
have global bounded solutions on [0, T ].
Moreover, when ℓ ∈ L, the equations presented in (1) have unique solutions.
is continuous for all t and ω, and there exists some finite constant C such that
for all t, ω, y and z. If ℓ ∈ L, then the BSDE (backward stochastic differential equation)
has a maximal bounded solution (Y, Λ). Moreover, Y is a continuous process and
holds for all t and ω, where (L, U ) are the unique solutions of (1) with b = ξ ∞ and a = − ξ ∞ .
Lemma 2.6. ( [24] ) Assume that f and h are two P B(R d+1 ) measurable functions such that (i) for all t, ω; f (t, ω, ·, ·) is continuous;
(ii) for all t, ω, y, z; f (t, ω, y, z) ≥ h(t, ω, y, z);
(iii) there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all t, ω, y, z; |f (t, ω, y, z)| < ℓ(y) + C|z| 2 where ℓ ∈ L;
If (X, Z) is a maximal bounded solution of (2) with terminal value ξ and coefficient f , and (Y, Γ) is a bounded solution of (2) with terminal value η and coefficient h, then Y ≤ X. We start by presenting several fundamental assumptions made in our model. For a certain stock price process P t , there is an insider who is risk-neutral and knows its terminal stock value v. The insider tries to maximize the expectation of his/her terminal profit as follows:
Here, following [4] , we assume that the insider chooses an absolutely continuous trading rule θ which belongs to an admissible set
Moreover, the aggregate order flow arrival Y t (caused by the insider's demand and the noise-trader's demand)
is assumed to follow
where B H t is a fractional Brownian motion independent of v, which implies that the volume has remarkably memory characteristics, H is restricted within ( 
Another assumption we made here is that that σ t follows
where M t is a martingale, the long term rate m(t, σ t ) and volatility ν(t, σ t ) are dependent on the past history of the volatility σ t , instead of depending on the history of Y .
On the other hand, the market maker is also risk-neutral, and has a prior information that v follows the normal distribution N (P 0 , Σ 0 ), instead of having the knowledge of the terminal value v. The market maker absorbs the total order flow by trading against it at a price which is determined to achieve break even on average. As the market maker is risk-neural, equilibrium break-even requires that the market clearing price is
Finally, both the market maker and the insider are assumed to perfectly observe the history of σ, which indicates that the filtration F 
Equilibrium price process
Definition 3.1. An equilibrium occurs when (P T , θ t ) satisfy the condition (7) while solving the insider's optimal problem (3).
To solve this equilibrium, we proceed in a three-step process: a) the stock price dynamic is presented, being consistent with the market maker's risk-neutral filtration, which is conditional on a conjectured strategy rule followed by the insider; b) the insider's optimal problem (3) is solved under the assumed dynamic (7); c) solving the conjecture rule (7) is shown to be consistent with the optimal solution of (3), which shows that we have reached the equilibrium defined in Definition 3.1.
We start by presenting a few lemmas, which will be used when deriving the optimal trading strategy of the insider. Lemma 3.1 below shows that the change of the stock price process P t is linear in the order flow, if the insider takes a trading strategy that is linear in his/her profit with memory.
Lemma 3.1. If the insider adopts the following memorable trading strategy
for some F Y t adapted process β t with
for any ε > 0, then the stock price defined in (7) follows
where λ t is the price impact defined by
and Σ t is the following conditional variance
Moreover, the dynamic of Σ t can be formulated as follows:
Proof. If the stochastic process ψ t is defined by
then the stochastic theorem of Fubini yields
Then, based on the expression of the fractional Brownian motion
we can obtain
This leads to 
ε tends to 0. Therefore, we hereafter use B ε,H t to approximate the original fractional Brownian motion B H t , which is a common practice in mathematical finance now [27, 30] . Now, with the standard Gaussian projection theorem (Theorems 12.6 and 12.7 in [25] ), we can derive
Here, the second equality uses the fact that σ t is independent of the asset value in the order flow, the third equality is obtained from the fact that the expected change in the order flow is zero for the conjectured policy θ t , and the last equality follows from (11).
Finally, applying the projection theorem yields
which leads to
where λ t is defined by (10) . This completes the proof.
As our model now exhibits long memory, we also need to introduce the new market depth process and derive the corresponding equilibrium price process, before we are able to find the optimal solution to the problem (3).
Lemma 3.2. Define G t by setting λ t =
Σt
Gt and assume that the market depth (i.e. Kyle's lambda) process 1 λt is martingale. If Σ T = 0, σ t is uniformly bounded above by σ and below by σ > 0, then there exists a unique bounded solution G t satisfying
Proof. By setting E[d 1 λt ] = 0 and using (12) , one has
with the terminal condition G T = 0, which implies that G t satisfies
Thus, √ G t solves the BSDE
where
If we define ℓ(y) =
, then it is not difficult to find that f (t, y t ) ≤ ℓ(y t ) for all (t, ω) and
As a result, according to Lemmas 2.4 and 2.5, there exist two solutions L(t) and U (t) solving
Moreover, it is easy to derive that
yielding the upper bound of G t . On the other hand, if we consider the solution to the following backward equation
with terminal condition x T = 0, then we can actually obtain
the comparison result of Lemma 2.6 leads to y t ≥ x t which further yields the lower bound on the maximal solution for G t .
If we define g t = √ G t and assume that there are two uniformly bounded solutions g 1 (t) and g 2 (t), then the difference between the two solutions,
If we denote
then a t ≥ 0 and exp − t 0 a s ds ∆ t is a bounded continuous martingale. Therefore, we can finally reach the conclusion that ∆ t = 0 since ∆ T = g Lemma 3.3. The price process P t driven by (9) and (10) converges almost surely to v at time T .
Proof. It is straightforward that
and
If we consider the process X t = P t − v, then
From (17), it is not difficult to figure out
which directly leads to lim t→T I 1 (t) = 0. Moreover, I 2 (t) can be alternatively expressed as
is a Brownian martingale, whose quadratic variation is equal to
According to Lemma 2.1, there exists a standard Brownian motion B t such that the continuous martingale can be viewed as a time-changed Brownian motion, i.e., M t = B M t . Applying the strong law of large numbers for Brownian motion specified in Lemma 2.2, we finally arrive at the desired result
This completes the proof.
Remark 3.1. If we define the mean-reversion rate of P t as
then we can obtain the mean-reverting form of P t as
and the insider would adopt the following memorable trading strategy
Remark 3.2. There is also a useful result about the limiting distribution of the standard price process
Itô's lemma can yield
which implies that h t is a time-change Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O-U) process with the following stochastic time change process:
being independent of the filtration generated by Z t . Furthermore, since E[h T ] = 0 and E[h
2
T ] = 1, the limiting distribution of h T is a standard normal distribution.
With the results presented above, we are now able to show that the market depth process is a martingale and a new bound can be established for G t , the details of which are illustrated below. Proof. From the definition of G t specified in Lemma 3.2, it is straightforward to deduce
which is a direct result of (17), M t is actually a martingale adapted to the filtration generated by the noise trading volatility process. Using the definition of market depth process, one can easily obtain
which clearly shows that 1 λt is a martingale. Furthermore, since Z t and M t are independent with each other, we have dM t dZ t = 0 and so d 1 λt dY t = 0. Finally, a further computation using Jensen's inequality yields
. This completes the proof. [11] , where the insider trader has an opportunity to wait for a better liquidity to trade. Indeed, the price impact must increase on average to encourage the insider to trade early and give up his opportunity to wait for better liquidity states under the framework of stochastic liquidity.
Lemma 3.5. If a bounded solution G t exists, then
Proof. Applying Itô's formula to G t directly yields
Integrating (28) from t to T and taking the expectation on both sides of the resulted equation, we can get the desired result.
Optimal strategy and verifying theorem
With all necessary results presented in the previous subsection, we are now ready to show that the strategy (24) is indeed the optimal solution to the target problem (3). The main results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. If price dynamic is given by (7), (10) and the volatility is uniformly bounded above by σ and below by σ > 0, then the optimal value process defined in (3) can be derived as
and the optimal trading strategy has the following expression
Here, the constant A can be computed from
where the dynamic of P t is specified in (23).
Proof. We conjecture that the target value function can be expressed as (29) . Applying Itô's lemma to J t yields
where the second equality is obtained using (20) in Lemma 3.3 and the third equality is a consequence of (12) in Lemma 3.1. Integrating (32) from 0 to T , we further obtain
If we define
then they are actually martingales for any admissible strategy. To prove this, we start from (23) and (24) by expressing P t as
where the third equality follows from (21) and the last inequality is a result of (4) and (13) . This implies that P t has finite variance. Considering that σ t is uniformly bounded, we can certainly obtain
and thus I 1 (t) is a martingale. On the other hand, it follows from Lemma 3.4 and Remark 3.2 that
which further leads to
In this case,
is also a martingale, since M t is a uniformly bounded martingale. As a result, considering Σ t is a decreasing process, I 2 (t) is a martingale. Now, if we take expectation on both sides of (33), then
for any θ ∈ A. Since
≥ 0, the expectation of J T , E[J T ], can be calculated from (29) by setting t = T and it is straightforward that E[J T ] ≥ 0, yielding
This implies that J 0 will be the optimal value function if there exists a trading strategy θ * t , being consistent with (10) , such that E[J T ] = 0. Indeed, from Lemma 3.2 and (31), we get
Therefore, we have proved the optimality of the value function and that of the trading strategy.
From Proposition 3.1 and Remark 3.2, it is clear that the equilibrium price admits a bridge process that converges to the value v which is only known to the insider at maturity T . This guarantees that all private information will have been incorporated into equilibrium prices at maturity, and the result presented in [3] that the equilibrium price in the continuous-time Kyle model follows a standard Brownian Bridge with the constant volatility is generalized. It can also be observed from our model that only if the mean-reversion rate κ t is stochastic will the equilibrium price volatility be stochastic.
Proposition 3.1 further indicates that while the optimal trading strategy for the insider is to trade
proportionally to the undervaluation of the asset v − P t at a rate that is inversely related to his/her price impact λ t , it is a monotonic increasing function of the current "state of liquidity", which is measured by the relative difference between the current noise trading variance σ 2 t and the expected noise trading variance G t , i.e., Gt . It should also be remarked that due to the presence of the fractional Brownian motion, our optimal strategy θ * (t), embracing the stochastic term (H −   1 2 )ψ t , also shows long memory, a property that is not demonstrated in [11] , implying that the introduction of the fractional Brownian motion has a significant impact on the choice of the optimal strategy. Some further remarks are made below for aggregate execution or slippage costs incurred by uninformed liquidity traders.
Remark 3.4. The total losses between 0 and T by noise traders can be derived through
The first component is the pure execution or slippage cost caused by the situation that market orders submitted at time t in the Kyle model will get executed at date t + dt at a price set by competitive market makers. The second component is a fundamental loss resulted from noise traders purchasing a security with long memory, whose fundamental value v is unknown to them. From this, using a similar definition in [11] , aggregate execution or slippage costs incurred by uninformed liquidity traders here can be obtained as
Remark 3.5. The unconditional expected profits of the insider can be determined through
where the first equality is obtained with the substitution of θ * t and the second one is derived using the law of iterated expectations. Being different from the results in [11] , the unconditional expected profits of the insider is no longer equal to the unconditional expected execution costs paid by noise traders, and instead, they have an additional component due to the introduction of the fractional Brownian motion, implying that the property of long memory possessed by the aggregate order flow has an influence on the insider's unconditional expected profits.
Trading volume, volatility and price impact
In this section, two special cases are considered to further investigate the effect of the noise trading volatility processes on the equilibrium, and they are distinguished by whether the growth rate of noise trading is stochastic
Deterministic growth rate of the noise trading volatility
This subsection will discuss the case where the growth rate of the noise trading volatility process in (6) is deterministic (the volatility of that takes a general form). Under this particular assumption, a closed-form solution for G t can be derived, based on which the equilibrium price process, the equilibrium trading strategy, the equilibrium volatility, and the equilibrium price impact can be obtained. The corresponding results are presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that the growth rate of the noise trading volatility is deterministic such that
is bounded for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Then the solution to (19) can be expressed as
and the stock price dynamic has the following form
D0 . In equilibrium, the price impact can be represented by
and the optimal trading strategy of the insider can be formulated as
Furthermore, the expected trading rate of the insider is
Proof. With the utilization the martingale property, it is straightforward from (6) that
In this case, if we assume that the solution to G t takes the form of (39), then it follows from (19) that
Clearly, our guess is correct if D t specified in the proposition satisfies this integral equation, which is exactly the case here. Considering the uniqueness we established above, (39) is indeed the expression of the target solution.
The expected trading rate of the insider can be computed from
which is a direct result of (19) , the dynamic of h t specified in Lemma 3.4, and ψ t being a martingale. Thus, using the identity
msds , directly yields the desired result.
The other results in the proposition actually follow from Proposition 3.1, and this has completed the proof.
It should be remarked that our model has successfully taken into consideration the effect of long memory, It should also be noted that the price volatility and the posterior variance of the fundamental value Σ t are deterministic, as a result of the growth rate of the noise trading volatility being deterministic, while the price impact is stochastic and negatively correlated with the noise trading volatility. On the other hand, the optimal trading trading strategy of the insider is not only negatively and positively dependent on the price impact λ t and the liquidity state κ t , respectively, it also exhibits the property of long memory, due to the introduction of the fractional Brownian motion. It is also interesting to notice that the fractional noise has no influence on the expected trading rate of the insider, which is also reasonable as this is in the sense of average. To further investigate the effect of long memory, how the price impact λ t (Kyle's lambda) changes with respect to the long-memory parameter H and the approximation factor ε is numeircally shown. In specific, Fig. 1 displays that the long-memory parameter H has a positive influence on the price impact, as a higher H value contributes to a higher price impact. This can be understood by the fact that more information is observed from the order flow when the volatility shows greater long range dependence. Moreover, the price impact is more sensitive to the time when H increases, while it is almost a constant when H is low, which is expected as the approximate fractional Brownian motion degenerates to the standard Brownian motion when H approaches 1 2 and the long memory property no longer exists. On the other hand, an apposite trend can be observed in Fig. 2 that the smaller the approximation factor ε is, the larger the price impact will be. This is also reasonable since there will be less fractional noise when ε decreases, implying that more information will be revealed, leading to a larger price impact.
However, it needs to be stressed that although the price impact is stochastic, the price volatility is still a deterministic function, and neither contemporaneous relation between volume changes and the price volatility nor that between the price impact and price volatility can be generated. Such relations can only be generated when the growth rate of the noise trading volatility is stochastic. In the next subsection, a framework generating both stochastic price volatility and a meaningful correlation between the price volatility and volume will be introduced.
Stochastic growth rate of the noise trading volatility
In this subsection, a special case where the noise trading volatility follows a two-state continuous Markov chain is presented, and this introduces state-dependent predictability, resulting in successfully capturing the stochastic expected growth rate in the noise trading volatility.
We start by specifying the dynamic of σ t as 
where G L and G H are the solutions to the following ODEs (ordinary differential equations)
with the boundary conditions
Proof. If we define
then it is not difficult to find that M (t) is a pure jump martingale, which implies that
leading to
Considering the boundary conditions G L (0) = G H (0) = 0, it is straightforward that
and thus
This has completed the proof.
According to Remark 3.1, the price dynamic can be written as
Clearly, it can be easily observed that the price now follows a mean-reverting process with stochastic volatility, with both of the mean-reversion speed and the volatility being controlled by the Markov chain. Moreover, a high value of the noise trading volatility always contributes a higher mean-reversion speed, which is because the insider is expected to trade more aggressively. It should also be noted that both the mean-reversion speed and the volatility would approach infinity when the time becomes closer to expiry, which can be explained by the fact that agents trade more and more aggressively when it is approaching expiry since they do not want to leave any money on the table. A positive relationship between volume changes and the price volatility can also be witnessed, as the price volatility always jumps in the same direction as the noise trading volatility does.
Extensions and discussions
While all the discussions above are based on the assumption that the aggregate order flow and noise trading volatility are conditionally uncorrelated for the simplicity of the illustration, this assumption can in fact be Proof. The definition of the time-change yields
the substitution of which into the equilibrium price process along with Lemma 3.3 and Remark 3.2 leads to the desired result.
From Proposition 4.3, it is clear that the equilibrium price is a time-changed Brownian Bridge, similar to
what is presented in the Kyle-Back model, where the price process is a standard Brownian Bridge. However, our equilibrium can not be derived simply using a time-change of that model, which is a result of the fact that the price impact is constant in the Kyle-Back model, while it is a stochastic process in our case. One may also find that price is a time-changed Brownian motion, belonging to the class of subordinate processes proposed in [10] , in the market maker's filtration. Moreover, our model gives an endogenous expression for the directing process τ t , which depends on the (uninformed) volume dynamic and the fractional noise, while having no requirement on the specification of a latent information process to generate stochastic volatility [2] . An obvious advantage of this model is its generality, as the directing process can be determined for any dynamic of volume, typical examples of which include Normal, Poisson, and Log-normal, implying that major stylized facts can be jointly taken into consideration, which is an important property according to [16] .
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a modified the Kyle model for dynamic insider trading, with the noise trading volatility and trading volume being respectively governed by a general stochastic process and a fractional stochastic process. Under equilibrium conditions, the resulted equilibrium price process exhibits excessive volatility because of the insider trading more aggressively when uninformed volume is higher. The optimal insider trading strategy displays long memory, and the price impact is negatively correlated with the noise trading volatility, which is also affected by the fractional noise.
The model makes many simplifying assumptions that could be relaxed to further our standing of how information flows into prices and how price volatility, price impact and trading volume change. For instance, we can consider the investment under varying time horizon instead of fixed horizon and assume that the presence of the insider is common knowledge for the market. We leave these extensions for future research.
